INDIVIDUALISM AND LEGAL PROCEDURE by unknown
INDIVIDUALISM A.ND LEGAL PROCEDURE. 263
INDIVIDUALISM AND LEGAL PROCEDURE.
An American youth, in a French government school, wrote
home: "The teaching here is fine, but on the whole I don't
like going to school; they boss you around too much. They
teach here on the principle of driving it into your head; and if
you don't move on the jump, both brains and body, the pro-
fessor lets out a yell," etc.
It has thus taken but half a generation to breed into the
bone of the boy the difference between French officialism and
that American individualism which is the most important factor
in American liberty, and which is also, perhaps, a large factor
in our material prosperity.
But while American individualism marks the highest tide of
political progress in the world, it seems as if it were largely
responsible for one American unprogressiveness-viz., in legal
procedure.
That same evil which the Preacher saw, thirty centuries ago,
when he said: "Because sentence against an evil work is not
executed speedily, the heart of the sons of men is fully set in
them, to do evil," is still seen, bulwarked by Anglo-Saxon con-
servatism and legal precedent; in a country willing, to try
legislative experiments along almost any other line; a country
of which Bryce says there is none other shrewder in perceiving,
or prompter in acting, when a law works ill. Of the political
"whips of time" which Hamlet enumerated, three centuries
ago, he would, if he should visit America to-day, miss two-
the oppressor's wrong and the insolence of office; but he would
still recognize the third-the law's delay. Witness; the twenty
days to file answer, which practitioner uses by writing in his
diary for the nineteenth day ahead,"Draw answer. Jones case,"
dismissing the subject until then; the wait of months for trial.
when witnesses may be gone, and certainly have forgotten;
the excessive length of important trials- the excessive right of
appeal, both civil and criminal; etc. The railroad, the factory,
the department store, the physician, the newspaper, responding
to the spirit of the age, all do their work on modern schedule
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time; but the administration of justice, in larger cases, sticks
to its mediaeval time-tabie.
Not because we do not recognize the evil. We know very
well that time is of the essence of civil remedies and prompt-
ness the most important element in criminal punishment. We
know that it seldom pays to sue; that delay fades true evidence,
and waters false, truth being on the surface and perjury at the
bottom of the well; that evidence before the coroner, or the
examining magistrate, is crisp and spontaneous, since the truth
comes out before its exact bearing appears, while by the time
of the trial the witnesses have become non-committal or
partisan; that, aside from all evidence, and as a matter of sym-
pathy, all delay, after the first few days, enures to the unfair
benefit of the accused, and that the very public, for whose
benefit the law of punishment exists, comes to feel rather sorry
for the poor fellow. The Georgia judge, who has recently said
that the talk about the law's delay as an excuse for lynching is
in the main without true foundation, may be right; and yet'it
may be true that if there were no law's delay there would be
no lynching. The deliberation marking the trial of McKinley's
murderer was a triumph for our- institutions; but an appeal and
stay of execution would have strained them.
But it is not, perhaps, so generally recognized that individual-
ism is, in large part, the reason why we are unprogressive in
legal procedure. There is the feeling that the individual
should have all the rope he wants, both as to time and testi-
mony, although the result usually is a bulk of evidence which
obscures the weight of evidence and buries those decisive points
upon which every case must turn in the end. We allow appeals
from court to court in all cases, encouraging the litigious spirit
and discouraging that submissive spirit which elections must
have, or democracy will go to pieces; grant new trials, though
substantial justice has been reached; are satisfied to allow ten
guilty to escape, to save one innocent; insist strenuously upon
the resolving of every doubt; all because the individual good
appeals to us more strongly than the general good. Probably a
suggestion that we might safely substitute for indictment by
grand jury the accusation of the coroner's jury. or accusation
by some elected official, ready to act at any moment; or that we
might, with advantage to justice, compel the accused to testify,
would be generally considered an attack on American freedom.
But does the safeguarding of individualism, in reality,
require us to block the development of legal procedure? Should
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we still be so afraid of our judicial machine as to fear speeding
it a little? We are speeding it in minor cases, both civil and
criminal, where various causes have combined to put a practical
time limit both to preparation and to trial, thus excluding all
but the decisive points; and it is standing the strain very well.
We are speeding it, to the limit, too, in that element of crim-
inal justice, that part of the punishment which is as important
as the final sentence-viz., arrest. There are no ifs nor ands
about the officer's "Come along with me;" and yet we find
practically no abuse of the power.
Salter Storrs Clark.
